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CASES NOTED
EVIDENCE - JUDICIAL NOTICE -
LAW OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES
The plaintiff, a citizen of Arkansas, was injured in Saudi Arabia when
his automobile collided with a truck driven b the defendant's employee.
Action was brought against the defendant, a Delaware corporation, in a
federal court in New York. Neither party pleaded or attempted to prove
the Saudi-Arabian law. The trial court refused to take judicial notice of
such law, which was applicable under the New York conflict of laws rule,'
and directed a verdict for the defendant. I ield, affirmcd, the court's refusal
to take judicial notice of Saudi-Arabian law was not an abuse of discretion
tinder section 344-a of the New York Civil Practicc Act.2 \Walton v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 233 F.Zd 541 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
The general rule in the United States is that foreign law is fact which
must be plcadcd and proved as fact; courts will not take judicial notice of
the law of foreign countries.:' In some instances courts will judicially notice
matters of common knowledge 4 concerning such law and will notice its
I. It is the duty of a federal court to follow the conflicts of law rule of the state
in which it sits. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
New York follows the doctrine that the substantive law of the place where the
tort occurred (the lex loci delicti) is controlling. Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways,
Inc., 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N. E. 692 (1935).
That this is also the federal doctrine, see Slater v. Mexican Nat'l. R.R., 194 U.S.
120 (1920); Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
2, The discretionary power, which the plaintiff contends the court abused, is
granted by the N.Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 344-a which reads, in part:
"A. Except as otherwise expressly required by law, any trial or appellate court, in
its discretion, may take judicial notice of the following matters of law:
"1. A law, statute, proclamation, edict, decree, ordinance, or the unwritten or
common law of a sister state, a territory or other jurisdiction of the United States, or
of a foreign country or political subdivision thereof. * * *
"D. The failure of either party to plead any matter of law specified in this section
shall not be held to preclude either the trial or appellate court from taking judicial
notice thereof."
3. 31 C.J.S., Evidence § 21; U.S.: Cuba KR. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912);
Ala.: Constantine v. Constantine, 261 Ala. 40, 72 So.2d 831 (1954); Cal.: Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 55 Cal. App.2d 720, 132 P.2d 70 (1942), cert. denied,
319 U.S. 774 (1943); Ill.: Detroit v. Wabash Refining Co., 223 Ill. App. 246 (1921);
Ky.: Stewart v. Bacon, 253 Ky. 748, 70 S.W.2d 522 (1934): Me.: Giberson v. York
County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Me. 182, 142 Atl. 481 (1928); Minn.: Traders' Trust
Co. v. Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 178 N.W. 735 (1920); Mo.: Scott v. Vincennes
Bridge Co., 220 Mo. App. 1213, 299 SAV. 145 (1927); Nev.: Celler v. McCown.
64 Nev. 102, 177 P.2d 461 (1947), rehearing denied, 64 Nev. 102, 178 P.2d 380
(1947); Pa.: In re Lyon's Estate, 164 Pa. Super. 140. 63 A.2d 415 (1949); Tex.:
Carras v. Birge, 211 S.W.2d 998 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Vt.: Wellman v. Mead, 93
Vt. 322, 107 Atl. 396 (1919).
4. E.g., "It is common knowledge that private ownership of property has been
abolished in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . with the result that none of
its nationals . . . is permitted . . . to have the personal control of any property .... .
In re Landau's Estate, 172 Misc. 651, 16 N.Y.S.2d 3 (Siirr. Ct. 1939).
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source or foundation,5 but will not take notice of its substance. However,
an increasing awareness of the inconvenience of adducing proof of foreign
law has brought about a trend advocating legislative action to insure judicial
notice.6 Care must be exercised in examining the statutes and their judicial
interpretation, for they generally do not authorize taking judicial notice of
the law of foreign countries5 The most widely adopted statute empowering
the courts to judicially notice foreign law-the Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act 8-draws a distinction between the law of "foreign" juris-
dictions within the United States and the law of foreign countries.0 Although
the uniform act, adopted in Florida in 1949,10 falls short of authorizing the
courts to judicially notice the law of foreign countries, it is a significant
improvemcnt over the former altcrnatives of requiring proof of the law of
sister states as fact or indulging in common law presumptions.'
In his treatise on Evidence, Professor Wigmore wrote, "No one would
demand that a court take judicial notice of foreign systems of law in foreign
languages." 12 (Italics addcd). In keeping with this concept, a statute was
enacted in Maryland' which states that the courts shall take judicial notice
of the law of any jurisdiction ". . . having a system of law based on the
common law of England."' 4 Applying this statute to the merits in Reisig v.
Associated Jewish Charities' the court found that a law in Palestine was in
conformity with the common law and doctrines of equity in England and
said, "In this situation, the courts ... are specially required to take judicial
notice of this foreign law . . .. 1l
Several states have statutes which specifically provide for their courts to
judicially notice the law of any foreign country.' 7 The Massachusetts stat-
5. E.g., "Our courts will not assume judicial knowledge of foreign law . . hut
. . will assume judicial knowledge of historical facts . . . as to whether they were
derived from the Roman civil law ...... Masocco v. Schaaf, 234 App. Div. 181, 254
N.Y.Supp. 439 (1931).
6. Sommerich and Busch, The Expert Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law,
38 CORNELL L.Q. 125, 132 (1953).
7. 9 WicMORE, EVIDENCE § 2573 (3d ed. 1940).
8. UNIFORM JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREICN LAw ACT §§ 1-8. This act was adopted
in 26 jurisdictions by 1956. For listing, see 9 U.L.A. (Supp. 1956).
9. That the framers of the act considered this distinction important is emphatically
pointed out by the commissioners' note. 9 U.L.A. §'5 u.l.
10. FLA. STAT. § 92.031 (1955),
11. Comment, 3 U. FLA. L. REv. 94 (1950).
12. 9 WIOIVORE, op. cit. supra note 7 at 558.
13. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 35 § 56 (1951).
14. For a criticism of the view that treats the English and American languages as
identical, see Mous, The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L. REv. 625
(1943).
15. 182 Md. 432, 34 A.2d 842 (1943).
16. Id. at 437, 34 A.2d at 844.
17. Statutes in four states provide that the courts shall take judicial notice. MAss.
GEN. LAWS, c.233 § 70 (1932); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1761 (1942); N.C. GEr. STAT.
§8-4 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5711 (1955). Two states permit the courts to take
judicial notice. N.Y. Civ. PHkc. ACT § 344-a; Mien. Comp. LAws'§§ 617.25, 617.27
(1948).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAw REview
ute,'8 which on its face requires the courts to take judicial notice, reads
as follows:
The courts shall take judicial notice of law of the United
States or of any state, territory or dependency thereof or
of a foreign country whenever the same shall be material.
It appears that this "far-reaching" statute dispenses with the requirement
of pleading and proving foreign law and places the full burden of discovery
on the court. However, in Roderique v. Roderique'9 the court stated, "Merely
to direct attention to the law of a foreign country . . does not make it a
matter for judicial knowledge.'1 0 There is also evidence that judicial treat-
ment has rendered the Massachusetts act completely discretionary.2 1
The leading case in the trial courts of New York which interpreted
section 344-a22 of the New York statutes is Arams v. Arams.23 In that decis-
ion, which has been widely approved in later New York decisions,24 the
court held that it could not judicially notice the law of Switzerland because
the plaintiff failed to plead it, However, the defendant's motion for dis-
missal was overruled on the grounds that the tort law involved was so
rudimentary that any civilized country would enforce it.25 After a rather
passive history of nearly nine years,26 section 344-a was interpreted by the
highest court of New York in Pfleuger v. Pfleuger.27 In discussing the
general construction of the statute, the court said, "Under its provisions
judicial notice of the matters of foreign law specified therein may be taken
by a court 'in its discretion'. In the exercise of such discretion the court
may - in passing on the pleading - take ... judicial notice of the specified
matters of foreign law depending upon the factors of time, cost, and other
adverse considerations .... "2,1s (Italics added). The court then proceeded to
judicially notice a Pennsylvania statute which had not been pleaded. When
the defendant objected that it was entitled to be informed of the law on
which the claim against it was based, the court directed attention to sub-
18. Mss. COw LAws, c.233, § 70 (1932).
19. 286 Mass. 77, 190 N.E. 20 (1934).
20. Id. at 83, 190 N.E. at 22.
21. See, New England Trust Co. v. Wood, 326 Mass. 239, 93 N.E.Zd 547, 549
1950) where the court said, "Although not so required, we might take notice of
urkish law. But here this is not practicable."
22. See note 2 supra.
23. 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
24. Meiier v. General Cigar Co., 273 App. Div. 760, 73 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1st Dept.
1947); Berg v. Oriental Consol. Mining Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Silber-
feld v. Swiss Bank Corp., 183 Misc. 234, 50 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
25. The effect of this presumption is that the case is, in the absence of proof by
the defendant that the foreign law is different, tried by the law of the forum. Thus,
the burden of proof is shifted to the defendant. For worthy discussions of proving foreign
law and the common law presumptions, see Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign
Law, 50 YALE L. J. 1018, 1035 (1941); Keefe, Landis and Shaad, Sense and Nonsense
About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. Rev. 664, 680 (1950); Comment, 3 U. FLA. L. REv.
94 (1950).
26. See Nussbaum, Proving the Law of Foreign Countries, 3 AM. I. Comp. L. 60
(94 304 N.Y. 148, 106 NE.2d 495 (1952).
28. Id. at 152, 106 N.E.2d at 496.
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division D29 of section 344-a and said, " ... upon that subject we think it
appropriate to suggest that the information the defendants seek may be
the objective of a corrective motion . . . or a bill of particulars . . . " but
its absence will not result in dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. 0
In the instant case, the court followed the rule set down in the Arams
case, but refused to adopt the theory that the tort law involved was rudi-
mentary. In the latter context the court can not be criticized, since the action
was for non-fault liability, a doctrine dependent upon master-servant rela-
tionships which are not universally recognized. The federal court-which
was bound to apply New York law as it is, not as the court thinks it ought
to be, 1 or thinks it will be-made no mention of the opinion expressed in
the Pfleuger case by the New York high court. The plaintiff was a stranger
to Saudi Arabia; the defendant corporation conducted extensive business
there and could in all probability have easily assisted the court in judicially
learning the Saudi-Arabian law with savings in time and cost. Perhaps this
was the type of adverse consideration the court had in mind in the Pfleuger
case in its general discussion concerning the statute and matters secified
therein. However, since that decision concerned the law of a sister state,
the court could not properly follow it as precedent in the instant case and
reluctantly permitted an apparent injustice to occur.
With the ever increasing rate of international intercourse, an increase
in the number of actions involving the law of foreign countries is inevitable.
The international traveler will need available means of establishing claims
and defenses based on foreign law. The majority of such actions will
undoubtedly be tried in the larger cities where necessary facilities, such as
a panel of experts and foreign law libraries, could be annexed to the courts.
It is submitted that a two-fold purpose would be served by equipping the
courts to judicially notice the law of foreign countries: economies would be
effected in valuable courtroom time, and a better form of justice would be
available to the traveler of modest means.
WILLANm A. KOLODGY
AGENCY - INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS -
NEWSBOYS
A newspaper carrier, while making his deliveries on a motorcycle,
negligently struck and injured the plaintiff. Held, plaintiff could not re-
cover from newspaper company, as carrier was an independent contractor
and not an employee. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So.2d 276
(Fla. 1956).
29. See note 2 supia.
30. Pfleuger v. Pfleuger, SU/,ra at 152, 106 N.E.2d at 497.
31. I]axon Co. v. Stentor Elee. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
